

24 February 1953

CIA STRATEGIC PLAN (FY 1955)NSC 10 Series Activities - Cold War

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INTRODUCTION

This plan is established for FY 1955. It is limited to cold war only and to those types of CIA covert operational activities authorized by NSC 10/2, 10/5, and related papers. Part II (Cold War) of the CIA/Opc Strategic Plan of 1 August 1951 is not applicable to FY 1955 and subsequent years.

The primary purpose of this plan is to summarize the cold war action which is required in FY 1955 by U.S. security objectives and which will be undertaken to the maximum extent permitted by CIA support capability. Further, this plan will: (1) authorize and direct further detailed planning; (2) provide a basis for preliminary estimates of requirements of resources and special support apparatus; (3) provide the foundation from which intensive staff review and Division action will develop the budget program and budget estimates for FY 1955; and (4) serve as a basis upon which status and progress reports will be compiled and analyzed.

Approval of this plan will constitute only tentative approval, as a matter of policy, of the specified task objectives set out in Annex B. Such approval will not be taken in any circumstances as authorization to proceed with operational action. Authority for such action will be given by approval of individual operational programs at or just prior to the beginning of FY 1955. Such operational programs will be prepared by operating Divisions in conformity with this plan and pursuant to instructions which will be separately provided.

1. SITUATION:

a. Introduction: In general, the conclusions of the authoritative intelligence estimates which are current at any given time will be the basic assumptions of this plan and, until revised or later estimates are available, NIE 64 (Part I) /1 and NIE 64 (Part II) will be generally assumed to apply to FY 1955. One exception is recognized. In this and subsidiary plans, if strong operational reason justifies, conditions intentionally different from current estimates may be assumed, if clearly stated as assumptions. The following subparagraphs in this paragraph are not intelligence estimates. They are specific assumptions believed most pertinent for this plan. They will apply until specifically amended, and will be constantly re-examined in the light of latest estimates.

b. World Situation: FY 1955 will continue to be a period of conflict -- of the proportions of undeclared war -- between the free world under U.S. leadership and International Communism based in the USSR. For the purposes of the activities controlled by this plan, it is assumed that this undeclared cold war stage will terminate only by:

(1) The establishment in the USSR, without the outbreak of general war, of a government without aggressive intent and well disposed toward the free world; or,

(2) The outbreak of general war which results in the establishment of either (a) a non-aggressive government in the USSR, or (b) Communist-oriented dictatorships throughout the free world including the United States.

c. Soviet Situation: In relation to NSC 10 Series activities, the factors of Soviet stability, intentions, and capabilities require the following special assumptions as primary guideposts in planning the direction, emphasis, and priority of U.S. covert operations in FY 1955:

(1) The Soviet government will continue to be the central base and the aggressive director of the International Communist movement, with objectives which, from its own point of view, are as determined as our own. Notwithstanding any apparent, tactical moderation which may occur, the Soviet objective will continue to be the overthrow of capitalism (identified with the free world) and the domination of the world by the Kremlin.

(2) In its own control

(2) In its own control of the USSR, the Soviet Government will be as stable in FY 1955 as in FY 1953, or more so.

(3) In all areas now under Soviet politico-military control, the effectiveness of Soviet control will have increased by the beginning of FY 1955 as compared with FY 1953.

(4) U. S. or other friendly action will accomplish some sporadic local damage to the Soviet clandestine apparatus. But in the world-wide aggregate, it will be assumed that such Soviet apparatus will not be substantially impaired between FY 1953 and FY 1955.

(5) The Communist psychological-political warfare campaign, including the so-called peace offensive and the portrayal of the U.S. as an aggressor, will continue unabated, if not intensified, and will continue to be effective in lulling the concerns of some members of the free world and in impairing effectiveness of action toward the Communist menace.

(6) It is assumed that the Soviets will continue in FY 1955 to use demonstrations and threats of military force whenever convenient to create tensions but, as the basis for this plan, it is assumed that the Soviets will not intentionally initiate general war before or during FY 1955.

(7) It is assumed that the Soviets will not precipitate local, overt, border-crossing military action, such as Korea, before or during FY 1955. However, it is assumed that the Soviets will continue to give covert or semi-covert encouragement and support to pseudo-indigenous takeovers, coups d'etat, or revolutions whenever profitable opportunity is seen.

(8) Notwithstanding the preceding assumptions that the Soviets will not intentionally initiate overt war before or during FY 1955, this plan will assume a greater Soviet willingness than in preceding years to accept the risk of accidental war. FY 1955 will, therefore, be presumed to be especially sensitive in the matter of balancing the objectives and risks in U.S. covert operations.

d. U.S. Situation:

(1) Concerning U.S. strategic capability, it is assumed that:

(a) The U.S. cannot reach before FY 1955 a sufficient level and scope of operation to force significant retraction of Soviet effort in the Western World and to place the Soviets in a defensive position globally.

(b) The U.S. cannot before FY 1956 mount the large-scale, coordinated, strategic effort required to decisively affect the cold war.

(2) It is assumed that the CIA will not have the active operational task of supporting U.S. ground forces in overt local war in FY 1955. (Intelligence and CE activities, which may increase, are beyond the purview of this plan.) While specific assumption on formal termination of the Korean war is not made, it will be assumed:

(a) That by FY 1955, U.S. ground forces will have been relieved of active combat duties in Korea; but,

(b) That such forces will be maintained in that theater at a lower strength level for reserve or support purposes.

(3) It is assumed that CIA operations will support any allied forces which may be engaged in overt local war in FY 1955.

(4) It is assumed that NATO military capability and unity of purpose will be greater in FY 1955 than in FY 1953. However, it is equally assumed that in FY 1955 the NATO will not be prepared to deploy and demonstrate military forces as a positive cold war instrument.

(5) Recognizing that changes

(5) Recognizing that changes in U.S. Governmental policy may have a marked effect on U.S. economic trends, it is necessary to make the precautionary assumption that levelling-off of U.S. rearmament during FY 1954 will cause readjustment in the U.S. economy during the following two or three years. Present planning for FY 1955 will assume some degree of business deflation continuing through FY 1955. The implications of this assumed situation will be:

(a) Increased pressure for resumption of trade with the Soviet Bloc, and increased Soviet opportunity and effort to penetrate the free world through such trade channels.

(b) Increased Soviet hopes for the economic deterioration of the Western World and therefore intensification of Soviet effort to win its objectives in the Western World by clandestine means.

2. POLICY AND MISSION:

a. National Policy Foundation: The policy foundation for FY 1955 planning will be Part I (NSC 10 Series activities) of the Clandestine Services Policy Book, and all documents, executive decisions, or controlling inter-agency agreements cited or contained therein. The emphasis, direction, priority, and phasing of plans for FY 1955 covert operations will be kept consistent at all times with currently applicable policy papers such as, for present illustration, NSC 135/3 and PSB D-31 of 26 November 1952 ("A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5"). The Policy Book will be followed closely by all staff and operating elements for changes and amplifications, and all extant planning documents will be promptly amended as required. On any matter on which general policy guidance is believed lacking but necessary for formulation of any portion of Annex B, the drafting element will make and briefly state its own policy assumptions thereon.

b. U.S. Grand Strategy: As applied to planning for covert operations in FY 1955, the elements of U.S. grand strategy will be:

(1) Ultimate Objective: To destroy the Kremlin-based International Communist movement at its apex without resort to or provocation of general war.

(2) Strategic Concept: The U.S., before and during FY 1955, will make aggressive effort to seize and keep the initiative in cold war action. The strategic emphasis will be to convert capability and effort to direct offense against the USSR and its satellites at the earliest possible time, with concentration on targets of greatest strategic importance rather than of opportunity. The planning of operational task objectives for FY 1955 will be based on comprehensive analysis, globally and country-by-country, to determine the character and force of Communist action and to determine where U.S. interest requires defensive holding only, pinpointed counterattack to reduce Communist strength and position, or aggressive offense. Offense will be stressed wherever feasible, and special emphasis will be given to deceptions and diversions which cause the dispersal and waste of Soviet resources.

(3) General Phasing: The planning of covert operations for FY 1955 will rest on these phasing assumptions:

(a) That U.S. operations will begin during FY 1955 to reach the level of strategic effectiveness in:

1. Forcing retraction of Soviet effort outside the Soviet Bloc.

2. Placing the Soviet Bloc in a defensive position globally.

(b) That beginning on 1 July 1955 the U.S. will mount decisive operations to attain the ultimate objective, b.(1) above, by no later than 30 June 1960.

c. Strategic Missions: This plan is designed to conform fully with U.S. objectives as established by basic policy papers. For the practical needs of planning, program management, and reporting, the U.S. strategic objectives which CIA covert operations will serve in FY 1955 are restated and amplified as set forth

in Missions A through

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in Missions A through F below. The mission statements themselves are the components or corollaries of the ultimate objective and are assumed to apply from 1955 on. The subordinate paragraphs under each are the assumed scope of action for CIA as phased for FY 1955. These missions will not be administered as mutually exclusive and independent tasks. They are the standards of purpose by which the strategic importance of proposed operational tasks will be evaluated. Any one of the operational tasks specified in Annex B may frequently, if not usually, serve more than one of the strategic missions.

(1) Mission A: To force the reduction and retraction of USSR power and pressure outside the area of its present politico-military control:

(a) Under this mission, in FY 1955, USSR power and pressure, wherever strong enough to be a danger to U. S. position and interest, will be aggressively counter-attacked. In areas of lesser threat, to the extent that capability permits, defensive postures will be maintained where required. This mission will pertain in varying degrees in all areas outside the orbit of Soviet politico-military control as it stands in FY 1955. Annex B assigns operational tasks toward this mission for WH, WE, and (for non-Iron Curtain target areas) for NE, SE, FE, and EE, and for staff elements directly responsible for conducting operations.

(2) Mission B: To impair USSR capability to wage hot war:

(a) Under this mission, in FY 1955, the area behind the Iron Curtain will be the primary target, but profitable targets will occur sporadically throughout the free world and will be attacked. Some degree of operational task assignment is specified by Annex B toward this mission for all areas and for staff elements directly responsible for conducting operations.

(3) Mission C: To build U. S. capability to undertake immediate and effective unconventional warfare operations in support of U. S. military forces in the event of hot war:

(a) Under this mission in FY 1955, preparatory action will be required in varying degrees throughout the world for support of specific military theater operations, for wider range clandestine operations which may transcend individual theaters, and for areas where overt military operations are not contemplated. Heaviest concentration of effort toward this mission will be in areas outside but adjoining the Iron Curtain, with as much preparation as possible behind the Iron Curtain, and with selected action for specific purposes elsewhere. Annex B specifies some degree of operational task assignment toward this mission for all areas and for staff elements directly responsible for conducting operations.

(4) Mission D: To recapture the satellite states and China from USSR control:

(a) The accomplishment of this mission is not expected in any satellite or in China in FY 1955. For most target areas, the action planned for FY 1955 will be the continuation of preliminary penetration and secure, selective buildup. However, the FY 1955 planning for any one target country may provide for preliminary and limited active operations where circumstances and operational capability appear favorable (or for the exploitation of any sudden, strong opportunity to accomplish this mission). In terms of target location, Annex B gives operational task assignments for Iron Curtain target areas for EE, SE, NE, FE, and SR. Related support and operational base activities in non-Iron Curtain locations will be developed in accordance with such target planning.

(5) Mission E: To confine the USSR to its own boundaries and render it internationally harmless:

(a) During FY 1955, action under this mission will consist of buildup and preliminary harassment and reconnaissance, looking toward greater concerted effort in subsequent years. Annex B delimits FY 1955 tasks accordingly, giving only limited assignment for SR.

(b) (Special note: This

(b) (Special note: This objective is stated in this limited and negative form because achievement to this point will end the current cold war phase of U. S. foreign policy. The imperative further goal of establishing in Russia a firm government which sincerely supports the objectives of the United Nations will start a new phase of U. S. foreign policy which is beyond the purview or anticipation of this present plan.)

(6) Mission F: To assure continuing orientation toward the free world in territory from which the USSR withdraws or is expelled.

(a) It is assumed that there will be no such territory available for action under this mission during FY 1955, and consequently Annex B contains no related operational task assignment. Whenever circumstances change to indicate the need for action or for specific preparation toward this purpose during FY 1955, Annex B will be amended accordingly.

(b) (Special note: By long-range logic, this mission should precede Mission E. It is placed last for the practical reason that some action toward Mission E will be possible before the conditions and targets of Mission F are available.)

d. General policy concepts: The above missions and the operational tasks specified in Appendices 2 through 9 to Annex B of this plan require some loser framing of the U. S. policy attitudes which are to be reflected in the planning and performance of the operational tasks. In this connection, special attention is called to paragraph 1-b, NSC 10/5, which states:

"Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination."

This purpose is not listed as a separate mission because it guides and permeates the entire group of missions stated above, but especially Missions A and C. This guidance and related questions are clarified as follows:

(1) International cooperation: To the fullest extent possible, the U. S. seeks the accomplishment of Mission A through the strength and cooperation of all nations of the free world. As a general principle, U. S. propaganda or other covert operations toward Mission A will seek to reconcile and discourage racial, religious, and nationalistic antagonisms in the free world, and will encourage and support the maximum measure of international cooperation and unity of action on military, economic, social, and political affairs. Any action or line taken to the contrary will be one which is consciously developed for use against specific targets within the Communist orbit, or for the isolation or coercion of a non-cooperating nation outside the Communist world.

(2) Orientation toward the U. S.: For the purposes of planning covert operations in FY 1955, the obligation of this agency to "strengthen the orientation toward the U. S. of peoples and nations of the free world" will be developed and applied as follows: It will mean primarily the creation of attitudes and actions which support the same objectives sought by the U. S., and the counteraction of attitudes and actions contrary to U. S. interests. Wherever compatible with this primary purpose, action may also include the instillation of confidence in the motives and judgment of U. S. leadership in the cold war. As a general principle, CIA covert operations will not attempt to press an identified, official U. S. viewpoint or the U. S. type of democratic, free enterprise system. (This is not intended to limit in any way the exploitation of local attitudes which coincide with U.S. philosophy.) The major burden of representing U. S. concepts, as such, rests on overt agencies and not on CIA. It is to be expected that CIA objectives and the intrinsic nature of covert action will require the exploitation and encouragement of political and economic attitudes which are not consistent with U. S. philosophy. In such conflicts, CIA will use the approach of greatest indigenous appeal and utility in achieving the specific result required. Proposed programs and projects when submitted for approval, will clearly show such conflicts and choices.

(3) Colonialism: While U. S. policy is sympathetic with the desire of peoples for free self-government, the general issue of colonialism and self-determination cannot be met in the operations of this agency by establishment of and adherence to a general guiding principle to be observed in all circumstances. In cases where conflict between a controlling government and

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the aspirations of a colonial area may be affected by CIA covert operations, U. S. strategic interest will determine, and central guidance will be sought if previous clear instructions have not been provided.

(4) Psychological conditioning: In the pursuit of Mission C especially, but also in the propaganda aspects of activities under Mission A, the action must include broad psychological conditioning as well as specific tangible results. Every vehicle involved in performance of these tasks will emphasize, as major purposes:

(a) The strengthening of the will and ability of the people of the free world to resist Communist pressure in cold war and Communist military advance and occupation in hot war; and,

(b) The strengthening of the will and ability of Communist dominated peoples in their efforts to free themselves from such domination.

. OPERATIONS: This paragraph treats the selection and further planning of operational tasks, including special limitations thereon:

a. Operational task planning:

(1) Operational appendices: Appendices 2 through 8 of Annex B of this plan are brief checklist summaries of action required country by country to implement the broad missions of paragraph 2 c above. Appendix 9 is a similar summary for staff elements having direct responsibility for conducting operations.

(2) Operational plans: On the basis of Appendices 2 through 9 of Annex B of this plan, to the extent that the budget calendar permits, the respective area divisions and staff elements which direct operations will prepare summary operational plans, as follows: In the area divisions, for operations to be conducted at the command level of a country mission, operational plans may be, optionally, one plan for one target country or a series for the target country divided by operational base location. Separate operational plans will be prepared as required for activities to be conducted from the command level of the area. Staff elements having direct operating responsibilities will prepare similar operational plans for their interests.

(3) Budget and operational programming: Depending on the budget calendar, as separate stages or telescoped with the operational plan stage, operational annexes and plans will be used as the basis for development of budget and operational programs for FY 1955.

(4) Additional instructions: Detailed instructions will be provided separately concerning these subsidiary plans and programs.

b. Criteria for operational task selection:

(1) General standards: Regarding both the operational appendices and the operational plans, the following general standards control staffs and area divisions in the inclusion and exclusion of operational task objectives and targets:

(a) Such plans will exclude objectives and targets which are completely impossible as actions during FY 1955, whether for policy, operational, or support reasons.

(b) They will include objectives and targets to which there are no known policy objections, which are strongly desirable to serve U. S. interests during FY 1955, and which have a definite chance to reach either preparatory or final action in that year.

(2) Special limitations: Certain matters of special importance, sensitivity, or risk will be handled with special consideration:

(a) Stay-behinds: Except as DD/P may specifically direct to the contrary, planning and programming for FY 1955 will presume that stay-behind organizations to be established in friendly territory for covert operational purposes will be undertaken only with the knowledge and co-operation of the indigenous government.

(b) Revolution: Except as DD/P may specifically direct to the contrary, no operation will be planned for FY 1955 with the objective

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of U. S. assistance to or encouragement of violent overthrow of any
non-Communist government.

(c) Use of U. S. citizen personnel: The general presumption for FY 1955 will be that U. S. citizens, or persons who have had prolonged residence in the U. S. will not be sent into or over hostile territory. Exceptions may be contemplated and included in proposed plans and programs, but only if specifically noted and justified.

(d) Sensitive actions: The general presumption for FY 1955 will be that this agency will not employ instruments of extreme ruthlessness. If any action proposal to the contrary is conceived, all references in general planning and programming documents will be highly euphemized, detail will be separately developed and protected with extreme caution, and DD/P ruling will be collaterally sought at the earliest opportunity. Similar handling will be accorded other actions, not within this category of extreme ruthlessness, which are currently subject to extreme precaution.

(e) Countersabotage: In view of the intricate inter-agency relationships involved, this subject requires special clarification. Operational task selection within this subject will conform with the following definitions of responsibilities and relationships:

1. On cold war countersabotage matters, it is a CIA obligation to notify the Department of State as follows: As discovered by CIA incidentally in the course of other activities, any adverse sabotage mechanism or potential, or threat to specific resources or facilities listed as critical in NSC 29 and 97/2. CIA will not initiate general surveys of such situations except upon proper external request.

2. It is normally expected that the counteraction to give specific protection to specific resources or facilities will be taken by the Department of State with the indigenous government or plant management or both. CIA will take such specific protective action only on request from the Department of State or other appropriate authority. This limitation does not suspend or restrict the CIA responsibility to protect its own facilities or to initiate general attack on Communist mechanisms as such, even if countersabotage by-products incidentally result.

3. CIA preparation for post-D-Day countersabotage action will be based on guidance from and agreement with the JCS as developed under War Plans. Pre-D-Day action of more than standby character will be handled in accordance with subparagraph 2. above.

c. Operational policy and doctrine: All planning and programming for FY 1955 will conform with and implement the operational security standards established by NSC 10/2, and with all further operational policy requirements established by proper directive. Appendices to Annex C (Functional Annex) of this Plan will give generalized instructions concerning functional techniques and their tactical potential for accomplishing this plan. Detailed guidance concerning selection of tasks and targets, or concerning the employment of a technique in an individual case, will be provided by PP, PM, and TSS in memorandum form and will not be a part of this plan. Such guidance will be reflected but not repeated in the operational plans of the Divisions.

d. Proposal of Amendments: Changes of policy, situation, and operational need will require repeated adjustment of this Plan and of further plans developed under it. It is the obligation of all operating and staff elements to propose promptly any such amendment found necessary.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Annex D to this plan:

(1) Delineates the general structure of apparatus for provision of resources and special support services to the organization and its operations.

(2) Outlines basic support arrangements with the Department of State and Defense.

(3) Gives broad

(3) Gives broad capability limitations for FY 1955.

(4) Provides planning guidance to operating and support elements.

b. Appendices to Annex D: Appendices 1 through 4 to Annex D will cover personnel, materiel, funds, and facilities. Tabs to Appendix 4, when required, will cover communications, training, medical, construction, supply, transportation and cover.

c. Subsidiary plans: The guidance provided in Annex D and Appendices 1 through 4 will apply to country operational plans and to area support plans. Throughout this and subsidiary plans, the provision of resources and support services for the command structure will be included as an area support plan.

5. COMMAND:

Appendix 1 to Annex B to this plan outlines the CIA clandestine command structure, both operational and support, for headquarters and in the field.

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ANNEX A

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Format and content to be developed by the Political-Psychological Staff
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ANNEX B

COMMAND AND OPERATIONS ANNEX

Appendix 1: Command organization

For the present this appendix will consist of the following statement: The structure of the CIA command and supporting organization as existing or authorized on 1 February 1953 will be assumed to pertain to FY 1955.

Appendix 2: Operational Appendix for WE.

Appendix 3: EE.

Appendix 4: SE.

Appendix 5: SR.

Appendix 6: NE.

Appendix 7: FE.

Appendix 8: WH.

Appendix 9: Operational appendices for operational activities directed by staff elements.

Preliminary action by Area Divisions or staff elements which direct operations will be requested by separate memorandum.

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ANNEX C
FUNCTIONAL ANNEX

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ANNEX D
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS ANNEX

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